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The Greek government and its creditors have still not reached an agreement on the release of
further ﬁnancial assistance to the country, despite fears growing over the state of Greece’s ﬁnances.
Charalambos Tsekeris writes that while the discussions have focused on a package of reforms
that must be approved by the country’s creditors before assistance is released, the nature of the
Greek problem goes further than mere ﬁscal and economic concerns. He argues that many of the
issues faced in Greece are fundamentally political and that reforms should go beyond the present
narrow focus on competitiveness.
Greece is a country marked by growing inequalities, poverty, destitution, staggering unemployment levels and
intense uncertainty as to its future direction. The severe economic recession that hit Greece has had signiﬁcant
negative consequences for the vast majority of the population, particularly economically vulnerable groups, and has
weakened the welfare state and social cohesion.
Many observers have come to the conclusion that the powerful political networks that ﬂourished in Greece after the
fall of the Greek military junta are now no longer functional. This is either due to the country’s economic situation,
which has led to the de facto loss of pre-crisis beneﬁts for members of these networks, or because of the collapse of
the social underpinnings that allowed such actors to hold power (e.g. the widespread loss of trust in the political
establishment). Both of these elements have reinforced one another.
Following Syriza’s rise to power in January, Greece
has exhibited the hallmarks of a country in transition.
The on-going standoﬀ between the country and its
European creditors is a direct result of the preference
of Greek voters to break with the policies backed by
the so called ‘troika’. Yet the policies backed by
Syriza have posed a challenge to Europe’s status
quo. The standoﬀ could yet provoke turmoil and
volatility, at least for a while, in European and global
politics, albeit Syriza still proclaims to have a
European orientation.
A related concern of European leaders has been that
the situation in Greece could help reinforce other
non-establishment voices and parties elsewhere in
the EU, such as the anti-austerity Podemos in Spain,
thus breaking the fragile and precarious consensus
that has held the Eurozone together so far. As
Syriza’s experience so far demonstrates, negotiating
debt relief is an extremely diﬃcult task, with the country’s creditors demanding a strong commitment to serious
structural reforms, which directly contradicts the platform on which Syriza entered power.
Yet the nature of the Greek problem goes beyond mere ﬁscal and economic concerns. In truth, Greece has never
been able to integrate its economic interests with the clientelist form of politics that has been pre-eminent in the
post-junta period, nor has it found a way to successfully reform the underdeveloped societal and governmental
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institutions that still exist within the country. Rent-seeking is a ubiquitous phenomenon in Greece: an embedded
structural condition whereby individuals act on the basis of their own self-interest rather than on an interdependent or
civic-minded basis.
Therefore, insider institutions and structures are still powerful and immune to whatever political party rules.
Independent of ideological identiﬁcations, political favouritism, patronage, corruption and vested interests continue
to dominate the distribution of spoils within Greece. Against this backdrop, passing signiﬁcant structural reforms is
far easier said than done. The reforms which have been achieved under the current bailout programme have
produced some short-term eﬀects in macro-economic terms, but have neither produced growth nor gone to the
heart of the country’s deeply dysfunctional political system.
And for all these reasons austerity is largely self-defeating, with resistance to change (or collective mobilisation
against reforms) remaining strong. Greece is therefore fraying European nerves once again, and what remains to be
seen is whether Syriza can make a genuine break with the country’s clientelist system. As the ﬁrst party of the
radical left to win power in Greece, it also remains to be seen whether Syriza can overcome the problems that have
blighted the Greek Left in the past or whether the party will inevitably get caught in a deadlock that jeopardises the
country’s future.
In complex systems theory terms, Greece may either be heading for reintegration at a higher level of complexity or
toward a relatively quick descent into chaos – a Greek tragedy for Europe. With the crisis talks currently coming to a
head, the existence of a stagnated system (Greece) within a complex environment (the EU) leaves little margin for
error.
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Note: This article draws on material originally published by the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG). The article
gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School
of Economics.
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